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NOTES

an exact replica of a case already decided-he acts at his peril 2s
in subcontracting the work without first negotiating his decision with the collective bargaining representative of his employees involved.
Julian Clark Martin

LABOR LAW -

SECTION 301 AND REQUIRING EXHAUSTION
OF GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES

Maddox, a laid-off employee of Republic Steel Corp., sued in
an Alabama state court three years after his discharge to recover severance pay under a collective bargaining contract. The
agreement provided for severance pay if any of Republic's mines
were closed permanently, thereby resulting in layoff of the mine
workers.1 Although the contract contained a grievance procedure culminating in binding arbitration, Maddox, rather than
utilize that mode of redress, sought relief in the courts for defendant employer's breach of the collective bargaining agreement.2 The trial court entered judgment for the former employee, and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed.8 On certiorari the United States Supreme Court reversed, one Justice
dissenting. Held, the federal labor policy which requires that
individual employees desiring to assert contract grievances attempt to use the contract grievance procedure agreed upon by
the employer and the union as the mode of redress applies to
severance pay grievances, thereby precluding the aggrieved employee from resorting initially to the state courts for relief.
Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 85 Sup. Ct. 614 (1965).
28. If the employer subcontracts without bargaining, and later is found guilty
of an 8(a) (5) violation, the Board has available the harsh remedy of compelling
resumption of the subcontracted operation, and reinstatement of the employees
with back pay. See note 3 8upra.
1. 85 Sup. Ct. at 615, n.1.: "The section of the contract dealing with severance
allowance provided in relevant part: 'When, in the sole judgment of the Company,
it decides to close permanently a plant or discontinue permanently a department
of a mine or plant, or substantial portion thereof and terminate the employment
of individuals, an Employee whose employment is terminated either directly as a
result thereof because he was not entitled to other employment with the Company under the provisions of Section 9 of this Agreement-Seniority and Subsection C of this Section 14, shall be entitled to a severance allowance in accordance with and subject to the provisions hereinafter set forth in this Section 14.' "
2. For this grievance procedure set out in the contract, see 85 Sup. Ct. at
620, n.2.
3. 158 So. 2d 487 (Ala. App. 1960), af'd, 158 So. 2d 492 (Ala. 1963).
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There are several remedial procedures available to an aggrieved employee at first instance. More often than not, the individual employee's industrial life is governed by a collective
bargaining contract which provides for a grievance procedure,
and seemingly the employee's use of the prescribed procedure
would be his most convenient and least expensive mode of redress. However, the individual may believe that his claim would
not be presented in a way most beneficial to him under the exist4
ing contractual grievance procedure.
Federal labor statutes seem to recognize this problem, and
in appearance, if not in effect, they limit the extent to which an
individual's grievance can be disregarded in favor of majority
interest. Section 9 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
gives the individual the right at least to present his grievance to
the employer without the intervention of the bargaining representative, provided the bargaining representative is given the
opportunity to be present at the meeting. 5 Section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 6 under which the
instant case ostensibly fell, has been interpreted as authorizing
the individual employee to sue his employer for a breach of
the collective bargaining contract.7 Additionally, the individual
4. Several factors may induce the employee to hold this belief the bargaining
representative may desire to reach long range objectives while the employee in
interested in an immediate solution to his problem; the employee may not believe
he is in the union's good graces because of various reasons (he may be non-union;
he may have defaulted in dues payments; or, he may have had a simple quarrel
with union leaders) ; or the union may have plans which do not include the rapid
solution to this particular individual's problems.
5. National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§159(a) (1952) [hereinafter cited as NLRA], provides in part: "[A]ny individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time to
present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without
the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is
not inconsistent with the terms of a collective bargaining contract or agreement
then in force; Provided further, That the bargaining representative has been given
opportunity to be present at such adjustment."
6. Labor Management Relations Act § 301(a), 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 185 (a) (1958) [hereinafter cited as LMRA] provides: "Suits for violation of
contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees
in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between any such
labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversylgr
without regard to the citizenship of the parties."
7. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962) overruled the prior
decision in Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse
Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955) and announced that courts could take jurisdiction
to hear individual complaints of contract breaches. In Smith the Court rejected
the contention that § 301 excluded all suits brought by employees instead of unions.
"Neither the language and structure of § 301 nor its legislative history requires
or persuasively supports this restrictive interpretation, which would frustrate
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apparently may enforce the bargaining representative's duty
of fair representation through the courts and possibly the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).s1
In Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills,9 the
Supreme Court held that section 301 of the LMRA not only
opened the doors of federal courts for the enforcement of labor
arbitration, but also required those courts to fashion a body of
substantive law to apply in resolving labor disputes. In Smith
v. Evening News Ass'n 10 the Supreme Court recognized the
standing of individuals to maintain a suit under section 301 and
limited the prior jurisprudential rule that state and federal
courts must yield exclusive jurisdiction to the NLRB whenever
an unfair labor practice is revealed by the complaint, 1 ruling
that section 301 jurisdiction prevails even if the breach of contract may constitute an unfair labor practice. 12 Smith specifically declined, however, to decide "when, for what kinds of
breach, or under what circumstances, an individual employee
can bring a § 301 action." 18 In Humphrey v. Moore,' 4 the Supreme Court again did not resolve questions concerning the import of section 301 jurisdiction, but it has been said that Justice Goldberg's "concurrence in the result" provided a significant indication:
"A mutually acceptable grievance settlement between an employer and a union, which is what the decision of the Joint
Committee was, cannot be challenged by an individual dissenting employee under section 301 (a) on the ground that
the parties exceeded their contractual powers in making the
settlement."' 6
It has been argued that the "fullest implications" of Justice
Goldberg's reasoning would admit jurisdiction under section 301
rather than serve the congressional policy expressed in that section." 371 U.S.
at 200.
8. See notes 37 and 43 infra.
9. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
10. 371 U.S. 195 (1962) ; see note 7 supra.
11. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
12. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 200 (1962).
13. 1d. at 204 (Black, J., dissenting).
14. 375 U.S. 335 (1964). The Court held that a decision by the contractcreated Joint Conference Committee, reached after proceedings adequate under
the agreement, was final and binding upon the parties. Since the aggrieved employee failed to prove a breach of the duty of fair representation, the Committee's
adjustment of his grievance was final.
15. Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 1215, 1230 (1964).
16. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 352 (1964).
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for individual actions by employees regarding contract breaches,
but that the courts would nevertheless refuse recovery in almost
every case in which it could be inferred that the employer and
the bargaining representative agreed to dismiss the individual's
claim. 17 Thus the refusal by a representative to process a
grievance would in effect be a renegotiation of any contract
right the aggrieved employee might have possessed.' If, however, such refusal amounted to unfair representation, a right of
action against the union and the employer would arise.' 9
When challenge is made to the standing of an individual to
bring an action for breach of a contract entered into by his collective bargaining agent and his employer, the courts will undoubtedly inquire whether that individual has exhausted his
remedies under the contract. Since the source of the individual's
rights is the collective bargaining contract itself, his attempt to
invoke the aid of the courts without prior use of the contract
grievance procedure will almost invariably fail. Thus if an individual tries to sue on a contract under section 301, he will be
forced to abide by the terms of the particular contract and avail
himself of any remedies provided in the contract before seeking
the aid of any court. °
In the instant case, the Supreme Court was concerned
whether Maddox' severance pay claim could be classified as an
exception to the general rule that federal labor policy requires
that individual employees desiring to assert contract grievances
shall attempt to use the contract grievance procedure agreed
upon by the employer and the union as the mode of redress. The
court first recognized that if the union refuses to press or merely
perfunctorily presses the individual's claim, differences may
arise as to the form of redress then available. Further, the court
declared that unless the contract provides otherwise, the employee must afford the union the opportunity to act on his behalf.
The court noted that Congress had expressly approved contract
grievance procedures as a preferred method of settling disputes
and stabilizing the "common law" of the plant. 2' Additionally,
17. Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 1215, 1230 (1964).
18. Id. at 1231.
19. See notes 37 and 43 infra.
20. See, e.g., Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962) ; Belk v.
Allied Aviation Service Co., 315 F.2d 513 (2d Cir. 1963) ; Donnelly v. United
Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963).
21. 85 Sup. Ct. at 616. The court referred to the following federal statutes:
,LMRA § 201(c); "[C] ertain controversies which arise between parties to
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the court emphasized the strong interest of employers and unions
in the utilization of the contract grievance procedure as an exclusive mode of redress, stressing the administrative desirability
of a uniform and exclusive method of settling employee grievances. More significantly, the court declared that severance pay
and other contract terms governing discharge are not essentially
unlike other types of grievances, since they are of obvious cqncern to all employees and remain a potential cause of dispute
22
which may disrupt orderly industrial life.
Justice Black, as the lone dissenter, felt the majority opinion
manifested great concern for the interests of employers and
unions but little understanding of the individual worker who
is required to "follow the long, time-consuming, discouraging
road to arbitration" regardless of his feelings and whether or
2 3
not he is still in the good graces of the union.
The effect of the cases interpreting section 301 of the LMRA,
from Lincoln Mills to Maddox, has been to sustain a broad jurisdiction in the federal courts to enforce collective bargaining
contracts, and arbitration clauses in particular, and thus to
promote and encourage arbitration as a method of resolving industrial disputes. An added impetus inducing management
and labor to resort to arbitration has been given in NLRB holdings in favor of honoring arbitration awards in both unfair labor
practice and representation cases.2 4 The factual situation of the
collective-bargaining agreements may be avoided or minimized by making available full and adequate governmental facilities for furnishing assistance to employers and the representatives of their employees in formulating for inclusion
within such agreements provision for adequate notice of any proposed changes in
the terms of such agreements, for the final adjustment of grievances or questions
regarding the application or interpretation of such agreements, and other provi-

sions designed to prevent the subsequent arising of such controversies."
LMRA § 203(d) : "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties
is hereby declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes

arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining
agreement. The Service is directed to make its conciliation and mediation services
available in the settlement of such grievance disputes only as a last resort and in

exceptional cases."
22. 85 Sup. Ct. at 618. The Court, noting that the Alabama courts had relied
on the holdings of Moore v. Illinois Central R.R., 312 U.S. 630 (1941) and Trans.
continental & Western Air, Inc. v. Koppal, 345 U.S. 653 (1953), reasoned that
since federal jurisdiction in those cases was based on diversity and federal law
was not applied, subsequent decisions had removed major underpinnings of the
decisions. Without overruling Moore within the field of the Railway Labor Act,

the Court refused to extend it to suits under § 301 of the Taft-Hartley
23. 85 Sup. Ct. at 624.
24. See, e.g., Insulation & Specialities, Inc., 144 N.L.R.B. 1540
Raley's Supermarkets, 143 N.L.R.B. 256 (1963) ; Raytheon Co., 140
883 (1963); International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962) ;

Act.
(1963)
N.L.R.B.
Gateway
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present case accentuates the high regard the Supreme Court has
for arbitration and its role as a stabilizer of labor-management
strife. Here Maddox was no longer an employee and in fact had
not been one for some three years. The Alabama courts weighed
this fact heavily in holding that federal law was not applicable
in suits for severance pay since the employment relationship
had necessarily terminated, thus ending danger of industrial

strife such as would warrant the application of federal law. 25
Even under these circumstances, the Supreme Court steadfastly
Railrefused to extend the rationale of cases 28 governed by the
27
way Labor Act to suits under section 301 of the LMRA.
It is submitted that the result reached by the Supreme Court
is consistent with the federal labor policy requiring all individual

employees to assert their contractual grievances within the
grievance procedure agreed upon by the employer and the bar-

gaining representative.28 However, it is perhaps a matter of
some concern, as Justice Black suggests in his dissent, 29 that
the federal courts have given overwhelming support to the interests of the majority despite the apparent grant of some freedom

to the individual to present his own interests before the employer under section 930 and despite the construction of section
30181 by the courts 32 in favor of the individual. The courts have
reasoned that it is not inconsistent with the NLRA, although
it is seemingly contrary to the language of the section 9 proviso,
to require all grievances to be processed through the contractual
Transp. Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1763 (1962) ; Montgomery Ward & Co., 137 N.L.R.B.
346 (1962) ; Denver-Chicago Trucking Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 1416 (1961) ; Osherwitz
& Sons, 130 N.L.R.B. 418 (1961); Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080
(1955).
25. 158 So. 2d 487 (Ala. App. 1960), aff'd, 275 Ala. 685, 158 So. 2d 492
(1963).
26. In Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. v. Koppal, 345 U.S. 653 (1953)
and Moore v. Illinois Central R.R., 312 U.S. 630 (1941), the Supreme Court
refused to hold that a discharged worker must pursue collective bargaining
grievance procedures before suing in a court for wrongful discharge.
27. The Court reasoned that major underpinnings of the Railway Labor Act
cases had been removed since they were decided when it was not thought that
federal law was to be applied merely because the collective bargaining agreements
were subject to the Railway Labor Act. The Court noted that substantive federal
law now applies to suits on collective bargaining agreements covered by the Railway Labor Act. 85 Sup. Ct. at 618.
28. See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964). See generally Summers,
Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv.
362 (1962) ; Cox', Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARy. L. REv. 600
(1956).
29. 85 Sup. Ct. at 624 (Black, J., dissenting).
30. See note 5 supra.
31. See note 6 supra.
32. See note 7 supra.
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grievance procedure, and now section 301 has met a similar fate
for the same reason, 83 namely, to foster arbitration as a stabilizer
84
of industrial disputes.

In the instant case the court suggests that the individual
may be able to resort to other means of redress, presumably to
the courts or to the NLRB, if his bargaining representative
refuses to press or only perfunctorily presses his claim. 8 Beginning with Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R.,36 the Supreme Court

has read federal statutes to require fair representation of employees. It has been said, however, that this duty of fair representation, as enforced by the courts, 7 has provided scant protection of the individual's rights because the courts have applied
a presumption of reasonableness38 which has virtually precluded
a finding of breach.3 9 Although it is submitted that this criticism
is too harsh, the failure of the courts to articulate workable
standards either to measure or to enforce the duty has led commentators to urge that the NLRB enforce the duty under its
unfair labor practice jurisdiction. 40 The initial adjudication by
33. In Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Mach., 313 F.2d 179,
185 (2d Cir. 1962), the Court interpreted the § 9 proviso in the following manner: "[T]he proviso was designed merely to confer upon the employee
the privilege to approach his employer on personal grievances when his union
reacts with hostility or apathy . . . . [The employee] is therefore without power
to compel Black-Clawson to arbitrate the grievance stemming from his accusation
of wrongful discharge. The Union is the sole agency empowered to do so by the
statute and by the terms of the contract before us."
See, e.g., Proctor & Gamble Independent Union v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co.,
312 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1962) ; Palnau v. Detroit Edison Co., 301 F.2d 702 (6th
Cir. 1962) ; Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers, 273 F.2d 614 (4th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 363 U.S. 849 (1960) ; Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69 (5th
Cir. 1945) ; United States v. Voges, 124 F. Supp. 543 (E.D.N.Y. 1954) ; contra,
Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963) (construing federal law).
34. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 85 Sup. Ct. 614, 619 (1965). See Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 1215 (1964).
35. 85 Sup. Ct. at 616.
36. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
37. See, e.g., Syres v. Oil Workers Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955), reversing per
curiam, 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330
(1953) ; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952);
Wallace Corp. v. Labor Board, 323 U.S. 248 (1944); Tunstall v. Firemen &
Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192
(1944).
38. In Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953), the Court
suggested the following: "A wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a
statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents, subject
always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion."
39. Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 1215, 1234 (1964); see generally Wellington,
Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal
System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327 (1958).
40. Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REv, 151 (1957);
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the NLRB 41 declaring a breach of the duty of fair representation to be an unfair labor practice was somewhat abortive, since
the Board's order was denied enforcement on appeal, 42 but a
recent Board decision stands as a reaffirmation and reiteration
4
of the legal principles first laid down. 3
It is submitted that if federal labor policy dictates that the
individual's right to prosecute his own action for breach of contract in court must be sacrificed to the needs of collective bargaining, the individual's rights within those internal procedures
provided by contract ought to have complete protection. It seems
that the last recourse for the protection of these rights is a cause
of action against the union and the employer when the employee
is unfairly represented. Regardless of the forum chosen to receive such a cause of action, it is submitted that the existence
of an adequate remedy for an individual's valid claim is of paramount importance.
Reid K. Hebert

LOUISIANA MERCHANT DETENTION STATUTE

To assist storekeepers in coping with a burgeoning shoplifting problem,' the Louisiana legislature enacted, in 1958, a
merchant detention statute2 authorizing privileged detention of
suspected shoplifters for questioning. The statute joined a
growing list of similar legislation by most states; to date, fortyfive states have acted in some manner to combat shoplifting
through the various expedients of new criminal provisions,
broadened arrest powers and a qualified privilege for merchants
Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in
a Federal System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327 (1958).
41. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962).
42. NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
43. Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. No. 166 (July 1, 1964), noted, 50 VA. L.
REV. 1221.
1. The number of reported shoplifting complaints rose 81% from 1958 to 1963,
and 13% from 1962 to 1963, FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 18 (1963). This
increase is attributed to greater opportunity made possible by the growth of selfservice merchandising. Shoplifting losses are estimated to run from .5% to
3% of sales, depending on the type of store. The estimated monetary loss is about
$300 million annually in the nation. See Gunn, An Advanced Study for Controlling External and Internal Retail Pilferage (1964) (unpublished thesis in Louisiana State University Library, used with permission) ; Comments, 62 YALE L.J.
788 (1953), 61 DIcK. L. REV. 256 (1957), 58 MIcH. L. Rav. 429 (1959).
2. LA. 1.S. 15:84.5, 84.6 (Supp. 1964).

